Israel as unmatched U.S. partner: JINSA’s last $3.8bn MOU is a proposal, not a treaty
By Patrick Lancier
TL;DR — The Jewish Institute for National Security of America, in “Shifting the Center of Gravity: Transforming the U.S.-Israel Security Partnership” (18 August 2026), writes that Israel’s value as a U.S. partner is unmatched and recommends one final 10-year memorandum of understanding that keeps U.S. military assistance at $3.8 billion annually, on average, for the next ten years, paired with mostly non-monetary cooperation. Jewish Insider (Matthew Shea, 20 August 2026) reports the same $3.8 billion as annual assistance through fiscal year 2038, and lists a larger U.S. footprint in Israel, a permanent presence at Ovda Airbase, a deeper defense-industrial partnership, and a limited U.S.–Israel mutual-defense treaty with a deliberately narrow activation threshold. This is a report. It is not a signed MOU. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has championed an eventual end of direct U.S. aid. These files do not say that aid has already been cancelled. No Senate vote is in these files. None is invented here.
What JINSA wrote: unmatched partner, one last MOU, $3.8 billion
JINSA’s own landing page, dated Tuesday 18 August 2026 and signed by Michael Makovsky, John Hannah, Blaise Misztal and Jonathan Ruhe, opens on Israel as “a small country of 10 million” that is “arguably America’s most important ally.” The security benefits the United States derives from the partnership, the institute writes, “far exceed the assistance it provides Israel.” Israel is, “by a substantial margin,” the leading military and intelligence power in a region critical to U.S. interests. Its high-tech economy is among the most innovative on the planet and drives investment and growth in the United States. Both its government and society are “unabashedly pro-American.”
The same page states the line this article is built on: “Israel’s value as a U.S. partner is unmatched.” It is already a critical U.S. ally. As America shifts strategic focus toward Asia and the technological competition with China intensifies, JINSA says Israel’s importance to U.S. national interests will only grow. Deepening military, technological and economic cooperation “will only strengthen American security and prosperity.”
The upgrade it wants is not a sudden cutoff. Given “prevailing political winds at home,” the institute says the center of gravity of the bilateral relationship should move from military assistance — “however mutually beneficial it may be to both countries” — to “true mutual collaboration.” That, in JINSA’s wording, “should take the form of a new, and final, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that keeps U.S. military assistance at $3.8 billion annually, on average, for the next ten years and is paired with new, mostly non-monetary initiatives.” Shea’s Jewish Insider piece, two days later, reports JINSA as calling for “maintaining $3.8 billion in annual U.S. assistance through fiscal year 2038.” Both wordings stay attributed. They are not merged into a third figure. No other dollar amount is sourced in these two files. None is added here.
Shea’s file: Ovda, a larger footprint, a narrow mutual-defense text
Jewish Insider frames the report against the fact that Israel and the Trump administration are negotiating the next U.S.–Israel memorandum of understanding. Even among hawkish Washington experts, Shea writes, the question is increasingly not how to preserve the traditional military-aid model, but what should replace it. The recommended “one final 10-year MOU” is, in that newsroom’s words, a sea change for Israel supporters who would not previously have advocated an end to this class of agreement — and who largely hope to replace it with cooperative, enduring programs.
The same 20 August piece says the report comes as Netanyahu has himself championed the eventual end of direct U.S. aid to Israel, and as elements of both parties become more resistant to defense spending overseas. That is a political weather report. It is not a cancellation. The current assistance model is not written here as already dead. A proposal to sign one last MOU is the opposite of a claim that the money has already stopped.
What JINSA pairs with the $3.8 billion, as Shea lists it: a larger U.S. military footprint in Israel; a permanent U.S. military presence at Israel’s Ovda Airbase; a deeper U.S.–Israeli defense-industrial partnership; and a limited U.S.–Israel mutual-defense treaty, “with a deliberately narrow threshold for activation.” Those are recommendations in a think-tank report. They are not deployments already ordered, and they are not a treaty already signed.
Misztal: the point is America’s benefit, and a shift toward Israel
Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s vice president for policy, told Jewish Insider that the strategy is catered to “America’s benefit” and seeks to make the U.S.–Israel partnership “more effective for both countries.”
“Closer alignment and cooperation with Israel across military, technological and economic lines of effort will help make America safer abroad, more prosperous at home and one step ahead of its adversaries,” Misztal said. “One specific area where we believe this should happen immediately is with shifting the center of gravity of U.S. force posture in the Middle East to Israel.”
JINSA’s own page makes the same posture argument: shift U.S. force in the Middle East toward Israel and away from vulnerable bases near Iran, a move it says would give U.S. forces greater security, interoperability and freedom of action. That is JINSA’s case for why a closer Israel is an American interest, not a favor Washington pays out of guilt.
CENTCOM, Golden Dome, “Model Ally” — recommendations, not signed policy
Beyond Ovda, Shea reports further JINSA recommendations: expanding U.S. access to other Israeli air and naval bases; a forward CENTCOM headquarters in Israel for regional planning, mission command and oversight of U.S. forces; a U.S. prepositioned arsenal hub; and expanding and modernizing the existing war reserve stockpile. The report, as he summarizes it, also wants joint development and production of advanced weapons and critical munitions; formal incorporation of Israel into the Trump administration’s Golden Dome missile-defense initiative; expanded U.S. procurement and coproduction of Israeli air- and missile-defense systems; deeper intelligence sharing on Iran, its proxies, China and Russia; and a “Model Ally” status that would frame joint research and development, co-production, reciprocal offsets and an updated assessment of Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge.
JINSA further recommends, in Shea’s account, deepening CENTCOM-led defense cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, with the eventual goal of a limited, U.S.-led regional mutual-defense arrangement conditioned on normalization with Israel. Every item in this paragraph is a JINSA recommendation as reported on 20 August. None of it is treated here as an executed basing order, a signed mutual-defense treaty, or a CENTCOM reorganization already in force.
JINSA’s accompanying statement, quoted by Jewish Insider, puts the test in American terms: “The question for policymakers is not what America owes Israel. It is what America gains from having Israel as an ally — and how much more both countries can gain by making that alliance stronger.”
The burden Israel already carries, as JINSA states it
The same accompanying statement, again via Shea, argues that Israel’s recent cooperation with the United States in the war in Iran shows the value of a more integrated partnership. The quoted language is JINSA’s, not a battle damage assessment invented here: “Israel fought shoulder-to-shoulder with America, carrying an equal share of the combat burden and risk, with historic levels of joint planning, intelligence integration, and operational coordination, while hosting and protecting more than 100 U.S. military aircraft and thousands of American servicemembers.” It also, JINSA said, “deployed advanced air defenses and troops to help defend a U.S. partner, the United Arab Emirates.”
JINSA points to Israeli defense spending of nearly 8% of GDP — above NATO’s new 5% benchmark, and roughly three times the share spent by many European countries — as evidence that Israel already shares the regional-security burden. Those percentages are JINSA’s, as reported by Jewish Insider. They are not recast here as a Congressional Budget Office table, and they are not used to invent a dollar total beyond the $3.8 billion already sourced.
What this file is not
It is not a signed memorandum. It is not a Senate roll call. It is not a claim that the $3.8 billion has already been cut, cancelled, or replaced. Netanyahu’s public preference for an eventual end of direct aid sits in Shea’s piece as context for why a hawkish institute is now willing to write the word “final” on the next MOU. The recommendation on the page is still a decade of $3.8 billion a year, on JINSA’s average, or through fiscal year 2038 in Jewish Insider’s wording, plus deeper cooperation that is mostly not cash. That is how a partner of unmatched value is treated in this report: not discarded, and not reduced to a line item Washington is tired of writing.
FAQ
Is this a signed U.S.–Israel MOU?
No. JINSA published a report on 18 August 2026. Jewish Insider covered it on 20 August. Shea notes that Israel and the Trump administration are negotiating the next memorandum. The “final 10-year MOU” is a recommendation. This article does not treat it as signed.
Has direct U.S. aid to Israel already ended?
No. Shea writes that Netanyahu has championed the eventual end of direct U.S. aid, and that elements of both parties are more resistant to overseas defense spending. JINSA’s own text still recommends keeping assistance at $3.8 billion annually, on average, for the next ten years. Aid is not written here as already cancelled.
What dollar figure is sourced?
$3.8 billion. JINSA: “$3.8 billion annually, on average, for the next ten years.” Jewish Insider: “$3.8 billion in annual U.S. assistance through fiscal year 2038.” No other assistance total is taken from these two pages. No Senate dollar figure is invented.
What does JINSA say about Ovda and U.S. forces?
Jewish Insider reports a recommended permanent U.S. military presence at Israel’s Ovda Airbase, a larger U.S. footprint in Israel, a forward CENTCOM headquarters, and a prepositioned arsenal hub. JINSA’s landing page wants the center of gravity of U.S. Middle East force posture shifted toward Israel and away from vulnerable bases near Iran. All of that is proposal language, not an announced redeployment.
Did JINSA call Israel an unmatched U.S. partner?
Yes, on its own page: “Israel’s value as a U.S. partner is unmatched.” Misztal told Jewish Insider the strategy is catered to “America’s benefit.” The accompanying JINSA statement, as Shea quotes it, says the question is what America gains from having Israel as an ally.
Is there a Senate vote in this story?
No. None is in the JINSA page or in Shea’s 20 August piece. This article invents none.
Sources
- Jewish Insider, Matthew Shea, 20 August 2026 — “JINSA calls for change in U.S.-Israel military alliance”: final 10-year MOU; $3.8bn through FY 2038; Ovda; limited mutual-defense treaty; Misztal; CENTCOM / Golden Dome / Model Ally as recommendations; Netanyahu on eventual end of direct aid; JINSA statement on 100+ U.S. aircraft, thousands of servicemembers, nearly 8% of GDP vs NATO 5%
- JINSA, 18 August 2026 — “Shifting the Center of Gravity: Transforming the U.S.-Israel Security Partnership” (Makovsky, Hannah, Misztal, Ruhe): unmatched partner; 10 million; final MOU at $3.8 billion annually, on average, for the next ten years; mostly non-monetary initiatives; shift U.S. force posture toward Israel
By Patrick Lancier
